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“He who may intrude upon another at will is the master of the other and, in 
fact, intrusion is a primary weapon of the tyrant.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Case of Brian Pietrylo 
In 2006, Brian Pietrylo was a server at a Houston’s restaurant 
operated by Hillstone Restaurant Group in Hackensack, New 
Jersey.2  While working at Houston’s, Pietrylo created a MySpace 
group called the “Spec-Tator.”3  In his initial posting, Pietrylo 
explained that Spec-Tator’s purpose was to “vent about any BS we 
deal with out [sic] work without any outside eyes spying in on us.  
This group is entirely private, and can only be joined by invitation.”  
He then proclaimed, “[L]et the s**t talking begin.”4 
Pietrylo invited past and current employees to join the group, 
including Karen St. Jean, a greeter, and Doreen Marino, a server.5  
Group members posted sexual remarks about Houston’s 
management and customers, jokes about customer service and 
quality specifications, and references to violence and illegal drug 
use.6  TiJean Rodriguez, a Houston’s manager, had St. Jean to his 
home for dinner, and during the evening, St. Jean logged into her 
MySpace account and showed him the posts on Spec-Tator,7 which 
Rodriguez subsequently reported to upper management.8  St. Jean 
provided upper management with her username and password,9 
 
 1. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to 
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 974 (1964). 
 2. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
108834, at *1 (D.N.J. July 24, 2008). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at *1–2. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at *3–4. 
 7. Id. at *2. 
 8. Id. at *2–3. 
 9. Id.  St. Jean claims that even though upper management did not threaten 
her, she provided them access to her account only because she thought she “would 
have gotten in some sort of trouble.”  Id. at *3. 
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and after reading the posts, the regional supervisor fired Pietrylo 
and Marino because their posts were “offensive” and violated 
Houston’s four core values: professionalism, positive mental 
attitude, aim-to-please approach, and teamwork.10  Pietrylo and 
Marino filed a lawsuit claiming, inter alia, invasion of privacy 
because Hillstone intruded upon their seclusion.11 
B. The Development of Privacy and the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
Section 652B Intrusion Upon Seclusion 
The common law torts of invasion of privacy and intrusion 
upon seclusion emerged from the advancement of technology.  
The advent of instantaneous photography and the invading 
presence of the newspapers into private affairs led Samuel Warren 
and Louis Brandeis to write their seminal article The Right to Privacy 
in 1890.12  The basic right they sought to protect was the right to be 
let alone.13  Seventy years later, William Prosser synthesized the 
common law right to privacy into four distinct torts: (1) intrusion 
upon seclusion; (2) appropriation; (3) publication of private facts; 
and (4) false light publicity.14  The American Law Institute adopted 
Prosser’s classification of the right to privacy in the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts sections 652A–E (1977),15 and the vast majority 
of jurisdictions have specifically recognized section 652B, intrusion 
upon seclusion.16 
Section 652B provides, “One who intentionally intrudes, 
physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another 
or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other 
for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive 
to a reasonable person.”17  Kuhn v. Account Control Technology breaks 
the tort into three elements: “(1) an intentional intrusion (physical 
or otherwise); (2) on the solitude or seclusion of another; (3) that 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”18  Traditionally, 
 
 10. Id. at *4. 
 11. Id. at *4–5, *18–19. 
 12. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 195 (1890). 
 13. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 12–13, 162 (2008). 
 14. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). 
 15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A–E (1977). 
 16. Id. § 652B apps. (listing “court citations to Restatement, Second”).  Forty-
two states plus the District of Columbia have cited section 652B since 1977.  See id. 
 17. Id. § 652B. 
 18. 865 F. Supp. 1443, 1448 (D. Nev. 1994) (quoting PETA v. Bobby Berosini, 
Ltd., 867 P.2d 1121, 1131 (Nev. 1994)). 
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intrusion upon seclusion has guarded against an intrusion of one’s 
home or other physical area that protects an individual’s personal 
matters, such as a hospital or hotel room.19  The emergence of 
online social networking, however, raises the issue of whether a 
private virtual space can be incorporated into the common law’s 
protection against intrusion. 
This article begins by presenting the emergence of social 
networking websites and the appropriate approach to analyze 
actions on the Internet.20  Next, this article argues that a private 
virtual space can satisfy the elements of section 652B.21  This 
analysis examines the comments to the Restatement, the case law, 
and the underlying public policy for the elements of intrusion 
upon seclusion provided by the Kuhn framework by (1) examining 
what constitutes an intrusion;22 (2) determining whether a virtual 
space can be “private” so as to establish an expectation of 
seclusion;23 and (3) evaluating the proper standard by which to 
judge what is highly offensive to a reasonable person within the 
context of social networking websites.24 
II. SOCIAL NETWORKING WEBSITES AND PROBLEMS OF PERSPECTIVE 
When approaching legal issues that involve the Internet, 
practitioners and scholars look for analogies between cyberspace 
and real space.25  To make meaningful analogies in the intrusion 
upon seclusion analysis, the nature of social networking websites 
must first be understood.  This section first explores the emergence 
of social networking websites to provide background on the privacy 
interests at stake; second, it provides an analytical structure for how 
to approach issues involving the Internet—whether the approach 
should be from the viewpoint of the Internet as a virtual reality or 
whether it should focus on how the Internet technically functions. 
 
 19. See SOLOVE, supra note 13, at 161–62 (referencing William Blackstone and 
the law’s treatment of the home as one’s castle); Prosser, supra note 14, at 389–90 
(explaining that an intrusion upon one’s home, a hospital room where a woman is 
giving birth, or a person’s hotel room all constitute “intrusion”). 
 20. See infra Part II. 
 21. See infra Part III. 
 22. See infra Part III. 
 23. See infra Part IV. 
 24. See infra Part V. 
 25. Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357, 361 
(2003). 
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A. The Emergence of Social Networking Websites 
Social networking websites have grown exponentially in the 
last five years, with the two largest sites being Facebook and 
MySpace.26  At the time of this writing, Facebook hosts more than 
750 million active users worldwide, who collectively spend more 
than 700 billion minutes on Facebook each month and individually 
create, on average, 90 pieces of content each month.27  MySpace, 
while losing ground to Facebook, is still the second largest social 
networking website with 63 million users.28  Currently, to create a 
Facebook or MySpace account, a person needs a valid e-mail 
address and must certify that he or she is at least thirteen years 
old.29  The person is then prompted to fill out a profile, which 
contains about forty pieces of personal information.30  In Facebook, 
people can network with others by asking them to be their “friend.”  
Once the person confirms the friendship request, they each have 
access to the other’s profile information based on the privacy 
settings each has in place.31  In addition, Facebook users can form 
 
 26. See, e.g., Clint Boulton, Facebook Passed Google, Yahoo, Microsoft in User 
Engagement, EWEEK.COM (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Web-Services-
Web-20-and-SOA/Facebook-Passed-Google-Yahoo-Microsoft-in-User-Engagement-
384309/ (“Facebook bested Web giants Google, Yahoo and Microsoft in time 
spent online in the United States through 2010, with users spending 12.7 percent 
of their time at the social network Website.”); Sampad Swain, Statistics: Facebook 
Bypasses MySpace and Twitter Stronger than Ever, SAMPAD’S BLOG (Feb. 10, 2009), 
http://sampadswain.com/2009/02/statistics-facebook-bypasses-myspace-and-
twitter-stronger-than-ever/.  Since 2009, LinkedIn and Twitter have become the 
third and fourth largest social networking websites, with 26.6 million visitors and 
23.6 million visitors, respectively.  Boulton, supra. 
 27. Statistics, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics 
(last visited Sept. 6, 2011). 
 28. Desire Athow, 10 Million Users Leave MySpace Within a Month, 
ITPROPORTAL (Mar. 27, 2011), http://www.itproportal.com/2011/03/27/10-
million-users-leave-myspace-within-month/.  In 2007, MySpace had 185 million 
registered users with 4.5 million people on the site at any one time.  Scott Elkin, 
MySpace Statistics, SCOTTELKIN (May 12, 2007), http://scottelkin.com 
/programming/aspnet-20/myspace-statistics/.  However, Facebook has come to 
dominate the social networking landscape, as MySpace lost 10 million users 
between January and February 2011 alone.  Athow, supra. 
 29. Privacy Policy, MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com/Help/Privacy (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2011); Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, http:// 
www.facebook.com/terms.php (last visited Sept. 13, 2011) [hereinafter Facebook 
Terms]. 
 30. James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1149 (2009). 
 31. Privacy Settings, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/terms.php#! 
/settings/?tab=privacy (last visited Sept. 2, 2011) (permitting users to set their 
desired privacy level for different types of information, including the ability to 
“customize” certain information, which allows the exclusion of specific 
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groups with other “friends” where members of the group can share 
messages, pictures, and videos.32 
The ubiquitous use of the Internet and the posting of personal 
information have created a “privacy paradox”: users of social 
networking websites tend to disclose a high degree of personal 
information online, yet retain an expectation of privacy.33  The 
strongest sense of intrusion is when people not understood to be 
part of a network gain access to the user’s information and 
pictures.34  To control access, both Facebook and MySpace permit 
users to set their desired privacy settings.  For example, users can 
control access to their profiles and allow only their approved 
friends to see their full profiles, while everyone else sees only a shell 
consisting of the person’s name and profile picture.35  Similar 
settings can also be applied to groups.  In Facebook, a group’s 
privacy setting can be: “secret,” where only members can see the 
group, who is in it, and what is posted; “closed,” where anyone can 
see the group and who is in it, but only members can see the 
posted material; or “open,” where anyone with a Facebook account 
can view the group, who is in it, and the content posted in the 
group.36  The issue of whether intrusion upon seclusion applies to 
social networking websites arises when a group designated “secret” 
or “closed” is accessed by a person who is not authorized.  This is 
 
information from particular people). 
 32. To create a group, a user logs in and from the home page clicks on 
“Create Group.” 
 33. Avner Levin & Patricia Sánchez Abril, Two Notions of Privacy Online, 11 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1001, 1004 (2009) (“[U]sers of social networking websites 
tend to disclose much personal information online, yet they seem to retain an 
expectation of privacy.”). 
 34. Id. at 1025–26.  Results from a survey of 2,500 respondents revealed that 
sixty-seven percent of respondents were more upset about family versus 
acquaintances seeing their pictures, and fifty-four percent believe that it is wrong 
for people to access information that is not intended for them.  Id.; see also 
Grimmelmann, supra note 30, at 1167 (“[For c]lose friends, it is always OK to 
comment on their profiles. . . . With distant acquaintances, it is almost never OK.  
It’s those in the middle that are tricky . . . .”); Michelle Slatalla, ‘Omg My Mom 
Joined Facebook!!’, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2007, at G1, available at http://www.nytimes 
.com/2007/06/07/fashion/07Cyber.html (recounting the horror of the 
journalist’s teenage daughter when she found out that her mom joined Facebook 
and began “friending” her friends) (the term “omg” is shorthand for “Oh, my 
God,” used commonly in text messaging or instant messenger). 
 35. Sharing and Finding You on Facebook, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com 
/about/privacy/your-info-on-fb (last Nov. 26, 2011) [hereinafter Facebook Privacy 
Policy] (select “expand all”). 
 36. Id.  When logged into Facebook, click on “Groups” in the left margin, 
then “Create Group,” which will prompt the creator to set the desired privacy 
settings. 
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the case of Pietrylo, who created the MySpace equivalent of a 
“secret” or “closed” group. 
B. Problems of Perspective 
A preliminary issue courts must resolve before reaching the 
merits of a case involving the Internet is to determine, as Orin Kerr 
puts it, the “facts” of the case.37  Should the case be examined 
through physical reality or virtual reality?  Kerr labels the viewpoint 
of virtual reality as the “internal perspective” and the viewpoint of 
physical reality as the “external perspective.”38  In the internal 
perspective, the facts follow the virtual perspective of the user; in 
the external perspective, the facts follow the behind-the-scenes 
perspective of how the Internet actually works.39  Perspective is 
important because the facts of the case differ drastically depending 
on the approach and can determine the outcome of a case.40 
Applying the internal and external perspectives to intrusion 
upon seclusion and social networking websites produces two 
different sets of facts.  From the internal perspective, a social 
networking website is an actual place where users can gather to 
share ideas, pictures, and videos and interact with others.  From the 
external perspective, social networking websites are nothing more 
than computer codes, wires, and hard drives.  For example, if a 
user of a social networking website sends a message to a friend, the 
user is instructing her computer to send a message to her Internet 
Service Provider (ISP), which directs the ISP to forward the 
message to the friend’s ISP.41  Which set of facts is most appropriate 
to examine issues of intrusion upon seclusion? 
To select the more appropriate perspective, Kerr suggests 
studying applicable law for clues of an internal or external 
approach, and if that fails, to adopt the perspective of the party that 
the law seeks to regulate.42  The first approach examines statutes, 
legislative intent, and case law.43  This approach provides little 
insight to intrusion upon seclusion.  Because the tort is defined by 
 
 37. Kerr, supra note 25, at 357. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 363. 
 40. Id. at 364–79 (illustrating the different outcomes as a result of perspective 
in cases of the Fourth Amendment, Internet governance, computer crime, and 
copyright). 
 41. Id. at 366 (going through the steps of sending an e-mail message). 
 42. Id. at 389. 
 43. Id. at 391–96. 
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common law, there are no statutes to examine or legislative intent 
to consult.44  Similarly, case law does not reveal an intent to adopt 
one perspective over the other because intrusion upon seclusion 
has not been applied in a meaningful way to the Internet or social 
networking websites.45  Therefore, the second approach will apply 
to intrusion upon seclusion involving social networking websites. 
The second approach is following the perspective of the 
person the law seeks to regulate.  Although Kerr is cautious about 
the second approach, he justifies it on the basis that laws are 
designed to influence the behavior of targeted individuals.46  When 
the law regulates offline conduct, the external perspective applies, 
and when the law regulates online conduct, the internal 
perspective applies.47 
Kerr illustrates the online/offline distinction by presenting two 
cases concerning the Fourth Amendment that are useful to 
intrusion upon seclusion.  The first case is United States v. 
Charbonneau, in which the court adopted the internal perspective.48  
In Charbonneau, an undercover FBI agent entered a chat room 
posing as a pedophile.49  The defendant was a member of this chat 
room and sent an e-mail to everyone with an attachment 
containing child pornography.50  The court analogized the e-mail 
to postal mail and held that because the FBI agent was “in” the chat 
room, the defendant had no expectation of privacy.51  While the 
court did not label its approach as the internal perspective, the 
court treated the chat room as a physical room, adopting the 
perspective of the police officer—the person the law seeks to 
regulate. 
The second case is Bohach v. City of Reno, in which the court 
adopted the external perspective.52  Bohach involves a case where 
police officers used the Department’s “Alphapage” system to send 
messages to each other that appeared on visual display pagers.53  
The officers were aware that the system automatically recorded and 
 
 44. See supra Part I.B (describing the development of intrusion upon 
seclusion). 
 45. See infra Part III.B (discussing case law interpretations of intrusion). 
 46. Kerr, supra note 25, at 396. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 398. 
 49. United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1179 (S.D. Ohio 1997). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 1185; see also Kerr, supra note 25, at 398 (discussing the reasoning of 
the court in Charbonneau). 
 52. Kerr, supra note 25, at 399–400. 
 53. Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1234 (D. Nev. 1996). 
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stored the messages on a central computer “because that’s how the 
system work[ed].”54  Focusing on the offline conduct, the court 
held that there was no search under the Fourth Amendment.55 
The cases Kerr presents under the Fourth Amendment 
demonstrate the online/offline distinction that can apply to 
intrusion upon seclusion cases involving social networking websites.  
When a defendant intrudes upon a plaintiff’s online seclusion 
using the social network’s website (e.g., Facebook, MySpace, 
LinkedIn, or Twitter), then the defendant’s conduct is online and 
the internal perspective applies.  When a defendant intrudes upon 
a plaintiff’s online seclusion without logging onto the social 
network’s website or using a computer at all, then the defendant’s 
conduct is offline and the external perspective applies.  In the 
Pietyrlo case, upper management accessed the private group by 
logging onto MySpace, using St. Jean’s login and password, and 
viewing the comments made within the private group.56  Upper 
management did not go through the ISP company to retain 
electronic copies of posted material.57  The internal perspective 
would thus apply.  For the purposes of this article, only the 
defendant’s online conduct within a social networking website will 
be examined, so only the internal perspective applies in this 
intrusion upon seclusion analysis. 
III. INTENTIONAL INTRUSION (PHYSICAL OR OTHERWISE) 
The analogies between cyberspace and real space in intrusion 
upon seclusion focus on virtual rooms and areas and real-world 
rooms and areas.  In making some of these analogies, a few scholars 
have argued that common law privacy and intrusion upon seclusion 
are unable to effectively deal with social networking technologies.58  
However, these scholars have not fully examined the extent to 
which privacy can be created on social networking websites, looking 
only at information available in the public domain.59  To fill this 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 1235. 
 56. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
108834, at *3 (D.N.J. July 24, 2008). 
 57. Id. at *5. 
 58. Neil Richards & Daniel Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 
CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1918–19 (2010) (arguing that issues involving protection from 
the media and the extensive collection, use, and dissemination of personal 
information by businesses has become more problematic with the use of social 
networking technologies). 
 59. Id. at 1919 (citing Muratore v. M/S Scotia Prince, 656 F. Supp. 471, 482–
9
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gap, this section will analyze what constitutes an intrusion and how 
the law should include virtual spaces as being capable of being 
intruded upon by examining the Restatement’s definition, case law, 
and public policy. 
A. Rule for What Constitutes an Intrusion 
The first element of intrusion upon seclusion is an intentional 
intrusion, physical or otherwise, perpetrated by the defendant 
against the plaintiff.60  There are three general situations that the 
Restatement identifies as an intrusion.  First, it may be a physical 
intrusion, such as defendants forcing their way into a hotel room or 
insisting on entering one’s home.61  Second, an intrusion can occur 
through the “use of the defendant’s senses, with or without the 
help of [technology], to oversee or overhear the plaintiff’s private 
affairs,” such as peering through an upstairs window with 
binoculars or tapping telephone lines.62  Finally, an intrusion can 
occur through an investigation or examination of the plaintiff’s 
private concerns, such as “opening his private and personal mail, 
searching his safe or his wallet, examining his private bank account 
[information],” or compelling an inspection of his personal 
documents through a forged court order.63  An intrusion of a 
virtual space does not fit under the first category of a physical 
intrusion, so it must find support from the case law in either the 
second or third categories. 
B. Case Law Interpreting the Definition of Intrusion 
Case law recognizes the role technology can play as a vehicle 
for an intrusion.  In 2002, the Ninth Circuit analyzed privacy 
associated with a personal website from a statutory perspective in 
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.,64 but noted the difficulty in doing 
 
83 (D. Me. 1987) (“Much of the compilation of data [that businesses collect] 
occurs from information that is in the public domain, and courts have concluded 
that collecting such data is not an invasion into a person’s ‘solitude’ or 
‘seclusion.’” (emphasis added))). 
 60. Kuhn v. Account Control Tech.,  865 F. Supp. 1443, 1448–49 (D. Nev. 
1994); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
 61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (1977). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id.  Such intrusions would also violate the Fourth Amendment’s 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.  United States v. 
Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1184 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (quoting United States v. 
Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417 (Armed Forces 1996)). 
 64. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002).  The 
10
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so because the statutes were enacted prior to the everyday use of 
the Internet.65  Nevertheless, the similarities to the Pietrylo case and 
the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning are instructive on how to treat private 
groups on social networking websites. 
Like Pietrylo, Konop created a personal webpage, controlled 
access to the content of his page by issuing account names and 
passwords to coworkers that e-mailed him for access, posted critical 
comments about his employer, his superiors gained access to it by 
using the account name and password of an approved member, 
and Konop was fired as a result of his posts.66  In its analysis, the 
Ninth Circuit found “no principled distinction between the 
employer’s eavesdropping . . . and Hawaiian’s access of Konop’s 
secure website.”67  The eavesdropping comparison would put the 
act of accessing a private group on a social networking website in 
the Restatement’s second category of intrusion, when private 
information in a private space is surreptitiously overseen or 
overheard. 
When technology is used to penetrate a private space or 
matter, an intrusion has occurred.  The Restatement specifically 
identifies the use of binoculars to look through an upstairs window 
or a wiretap on a telephone as intrusions upon seclusion.68  The 
courts have broadened section 652B’s reach to also include the use 
of television cameras69 and microphones70 as means capable of 
intrusion.  The common element is that technology provides access 
to otherwise private information or spaces.  The trajectory of the 
 
plaintiff brought claims under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the 
Stored Communications Act, and the Railway Labor Act.  Id. 
 65. Id. at 874 (“[T]he difficulty is compounded by the fact that the ECPA was 
written prior to the advent of the Internet and the World Wide Web.”). 
 66. Id. at 872–73. 
 67. Id. at 884. 
 68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (1977); see also Ali v. 
Douglas Cable Commc’ns, 929 F. Supp. 1362 (D. Kan. 1996) (holding that 
unannounced recordings of personal telephone calls at work constituted an 
intrusion). 
 69. See Huskey v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (holding 
that an NBC camera man intruded upon a prisoner’s seclusion by videotaping him 
without his consent); Sanders v. Am. Broad. Cos., 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999) 
(holding that ABC intruded by surreptitiously videotaping conversations with 
coworkers); Y.G. & L.G. v. Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 795 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1990) (holding a news crew violated a couple’s privacy by showing footage of them 
at a hospital event after they actively tried to avoid the cameras). 
 70. Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998) (holding that a 
flight nurse who wore a microphone so that a television producer could record the 
statements made by a car accident victim while being transported to the hospital 
constituted an intrusion). 
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common law is broadening the Restatement to include 
technologies that make an intrusion possible.  The Ninth Circuit’s 
comparison of accessing a private website to eavesdropping and the 
common law’s expansive approach suggests that the element of 
intentional intrusion of section 652B is satisfied by the infiltration 
of a private group on a social networking website. 
Moreover, unauthorized access into a private virtual space is or 
should be an intrusion to remain consistent with the virtual space’s 
physical counterparts.  The Restatement identifies that opening 
personal mail or examining private bank account information can 
result in an intrusion.71  Likewise, opening other people’s e-mail or 
viewing their banking information online is as intrusive as if the 
same information were accessed in paper form.  Because the act of 
eavesdropping on a private in-person conversation constitutes an 
intrusion, the same result should extend to online conversations 
held in a private virtual space. 
Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases also suggest that 
a private profile or group on a social networking website deserves 
privacy protection.  The test for whether a space is private under 
the Fourth Amendment is whether there is an actual, subjective 
expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable.72  The Supreme Court ruled that anything exposed to 
the public does not constitute a search.73  Examples include a pen 
register used by the phone company to determine what phone 
numbers have been dialed from a private home74 and aerial 
 
 71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (1977). 
 72. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)); see also Afsheen John 
Radsan, The Case for Stewart over Harlan on 24/7 Physical Surveillance, 88 TEX. L. REV. 
1475, 1480–90 (2010) (surveying the Supreme Court’s decisions on surveillance 
and assessing the federal circuit courts of appeals’ adherence to Justice Harlan’s 
two-pronged test). 
 73. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351; id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 74. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).  The Court focused on the 
facts that all telephone users know that they must convey their phone numbers to 
the phone company, that phone companies make permanent records of the 
numbers dialed for monthly billing, and pen registers are used to check billing 
operations, detect fraud, and prevent illegal activity.  Id.  The approach the Court 
used in this case would be Kerr’s external perspective of looking at how 
technology actually works.  Kerr, supra note 25, at 357.  While the external 
approach does not apply to the type of actions analyzed in this article, it does 
illustrate how the external approach will often result in the destruction of privacy 
because information is conveyed to third parties, such as Facebook administrators, 
who reserve the right to remove any posts or materials that violate its terms of use.  
Facebook Terms, supra note 29. 
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surveillance of private homes.75  Applying this reasoning to profiles 
or groups on social networking websites that are left open by users 
likewise results in no privacy protection.  Facebook explicitly states, 
“[w]hen you publish content or information using the Public 
setting, it means that you are allowing everyone, including people 
off of Facebook, to access and use that information, and to 
associate it with you (i.e., your name and profile picture).”76  The 
public exposure of an open profile or group on a social networking 
website precludes any privacy protection. 
When steps are taken to retain privacy, however, the Supreme 
Court protects the space.  Simply by walking inside a telephone 
booth and pulling the door shut behind him, Katz established a 
sufficient privacy expectation to be protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.77  Fourth Amendment privacy protection also applies 
when an electronic beeper in a container of chemicals is brought 
inside a house and reveals information (the location and 
movement of the chemicals inside the house) that could not have 
been obtained without a warrant78 and to infrared radiation 
emanating from the home that was detected using technology not 
available to the general public.79  When social network users create 
a private profile or group, it is as if they are closing the virtual door 
behind them.  Everyone, including people off of Facebook, can no 
longer see their profile or groups.  Any unauthorized monitoring 
or viewing of the private virtual space would constitute an 
intrusion.  The case law interpreting statute, common law, and the 
Fourth Amendment all indicate that a private virtual space created 
on a social networking website constitutes a space that can be 
intruded upon. 
C. Public Policy Reasons for Extending Intrusion to Virtual Spaces 
The harm associated with intrusion is surveillance.  Daniel 
Solove describes “surveillance” as an awareness that one is being 
watched.80  As a result, surveillance can lead to anxiety, discomfort, 
 
 75. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1989); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215. 
 76. Facebook Terms, supra note 29. 
 77. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352. 
 78. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 711 (1984). 
 79. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (“Where, as here, the 
Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of 
the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, 
the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a 
warrant.”). 
 80. SOLOVE, supra note 13, at 106–12. 
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self-censorship, and inhibition.81  Intrusion protects the individual 
by creating liability for such unwanted social invasions, which 
Solove links to what Warren and Brandeis termed “the right to be 
let alone.”82 
The concept of surveillance appears to be a concern for users 
of social networking websites.  In a survey of 2,500 respondents, 
almost twenty-four percent were concerned or very concerned with 
the possibility that their parents could view their profiles, almost 
thirty-five percent of users were concerned or very concerned that 
their employer could access their profile, and forty-three percent 
were worried about strangers.83  A commonsense response to such 
concerns is that if people are truly concerned about such 
information getting out, they simply should not post it on social 
networking websites, or they should apply the appropriate privacy 
settings that match their desired protection.  However, this is not a 
satisfying answer.  If someone wishes to share information with a 
certain group and takes measures to create seclusion from others, 
that space should be recognized as private by the law. 
Solove argues that to adequately address the problems of 
privacy on the Internet, the law should enforce an individual’s 
social expectations of confidentiality.84  Such expectations should 
be enforced even if the surveillance is covert and the victim is never 
aware of the actual intrusion, because the harms have a chilling 
effect on behavior and speech.85  The chilling effect applies equally 
to positive messages and negative messages because surveillance 
affects all forms of speech on the Internet through intrusion.  
While people should be held accountable for what they say and do 
on social networking websites, such monitoring should not come at 
the expense of otherwise legitimate speech.  As a matter of public 
policy, when a person creates and maintains a private group within 
a virtual space on a social networking website, the common law and 
section 652B should recognize unauthorized access as an intrusion 
to protect against surveillance and its associated harms. 
 
 81. Id. at 108; see also Grimmelmann, supra note 30, at 1166 (applying 
Professor Solove’s paradigm to surveillance on Facebook). 
 82. SOLOVE, supra note 13, at 162. 
 83. Levin & Abril, supra note 33, at 1025–26. 
 84. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND 
PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 191 (2007); see also Samantha L. Millier, Note, The 
Facebook Frontier: Responding to the Changing Face of Privacy on the Internet, 97 KY. L.J. 
541, 549–50 (2009) (discussing Professor Solove’s view of privacy on the Internet 
and his solutions to privacy concerns). 
 85. SOLOVE, supra note 13, at 109. 
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol38/iss1/7
2011] ARE PRIVATE SPACES TRULY PRIVATE? 411 
IV. SOLITUDE OR SECLUSION 
The previous section established that virtual spaces can be 
intruded upon, and the next issue is whether a plaintiff can 
demonstrate adequate seclusion while on social networking 
websites.  This section argues that plaintiffs can establish adequate 
seclusion to support a claim of intrusion upon seclusion.  To do so, 
this section first provides the Restatement’s definition of seclusion 
and applies it to social networking websites; second, it analyzes the 
nature of seclusion within a group and then on the Internet; and 
finally, it examines public policy issues related to “Facebook 
stalking.” 
A. Rule for What Constitutes Seclusion 
The Restatement provides that for defendants to be subject to 
liability, they must have intruded into “a private place” or “a private 
seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about his person or affairs.”86  
However, there is no liability for examining things that are already 
public or part of a public record, and there is no liability for 
observing or taking someone’s photograph while in public.87  
Nevertheless, some matters may still be considered private when in 
the public sphere, such as the plaintiff’s underwear or lack 
thereof.88 
Extrapolating from the premises above suggests that profiles 
and groups on social networking websites without any privacy 
settings—leaving them “open” to anyone who clicks on them—do 
not establish seclusion because the users have not attempted to 
conceal their persons or affairs.89  Moreover, posting information 
on the Internet without taking any steps to make it private is 
analogous to going out in public.  The Restatement makes clear 
that seclusion does not attach to actions and communications 
performed in public,90 and therefore a claim for invasion of privacy 
 
 86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Facebook Terms, supra note 29 (Facebook administrators explicitly state, 
“When you publish content or information using the Public setting, it means that 
you are allowing everyone, including people off of Facebook, to access and use 
that information, and to associate it with you (i.e., your name and profile 
picture).”); Facebook Privacy Policy, supra note 35 and accompanying text 
(explaining that online social network users can select their desired level of 
privacy). 
 90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977). 
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would probably fail for open profiles or groups on social 
networking websites. 
There are two issues that follow for private groups.  The first 
issue is whether the presence of multiple people within a private 
group precludes an individual within the group from claiming 
seclusion.  The second issue is whether the nature of the Internet 
refutes any claims of seclusion even if an individual can maintain 
seclusion while in a group. 
B. Case Law Interpreting the Definition of Seclusion 
1. Seclusion Within a Group 
Normally when people enter the public sphere, they do not 
have an expectation of privacy because they have stepped outside 
their zone of seclusion, but it is not a complete loss of seclusion.  In 
Huskey v. National Broadcasting Co.,91 a television crew was working 
on a story about the Illinois prison system.92  A cameraman shot 
footage of a prisoner exercising in the jailhouse gym with his shirt 
off, but the inmate was concerned about others outside of the jail 
seeing his tattoos.93  Even though the prison guards and anyone 
else who walked by could see him, the court reasoned that “the 
mere fact a person can be seen by others does not mean that 
person cannot legally be ‘secluded.’”94  The courts have extended 
this principle to protect a couple attending a private event at a 
hospital that was covered by a television news crew,95 a car accident 
victim’s conversation while in a helicopter transporting her to the 
hospital,96 a couple filmed in the dining room of a private 
restaurant,97 and employees’ conversations filmed at a private 
“telepsychic” business by an investigative reporter wearing a hidden 
 
 91. Huskey v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 632 F. Supp. 1282 (N.D. Ill. 1986). 
 92. Id. at 1285. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 1287–88. 
 95. Y.G. & L.G. v. Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 795 S.W.2d 488, 502 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1990) (holding that a couple attending an event at the hospital for in vitro 
couples only chose to disclose their participation to other in vitro couples and that 
“they did not waive the right to keep their condition and the process of in vitro 
private, in respect to the general public”). 
 96. Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 492–94 (Cal. 1998) 
(holding that a helicopter nurse who wore a microphone for television producers 
intruded upon the victim’s seclusion because the course of receiving emergency 
treatment “carries a traditional and legally well-established expectation of 
privacy”). 
 97. Stessman v. Am. Black Hawk Broad. Co., 416 N.W.2d 685 (Iowa 1987). 
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camera.98 
The principle that the presence of others does not necessarily 
destroy the protection of seclusion also governs the workplace 
environment.  In United States v. McIntyre,99 a city’s police chief 
ordered two officers to bug the assistant chief’s office.100  Although 
the assistant chief’s door was open and a secretary worked fifteen 
feet away at the time the assistant chief made the recorded 
statements, the court ruled, “[a] business office need not be sealed 
to offer its occupant a reasonable degree of privacy.”101  Not only is 
aural privacy within the workplace protected, but also visual 
privacy.  In Doe v. B.P.S. Guard Services, Inc.,102 the organizers of a 
fashion show set up a curtained dressing area for the models at the 
convention center, but did not realize that a security video camera 
could see into the area.103  When security guards used the 
surveillance camera to watch and videotape the models changing 
clothes, the court found the actions intruded upon the seclusion of 
the models.104 
Not all surreptitious video and audio recordings in the 
workplace, however, intrude upon an employee’s seclusion.  In 
Marrs v. Marriott Corp., an employer videotaped an employee while 
he was picking a locked drawer of a desk in an open office area.105  
Kemp v. Block is a case in which an employee recorded a heated 
argument with his supervisor in an area where coworkers could 
overhear them.106  In both cases the courts ruled that the 
defendants did not intrude upon the plaintiffs’ seclusion because 
the plaintiffs had no privacy vis-à-vis the coworkers who shared that 
space.107  The seclusion-within-a-group line of cases provides that 
seclusion can be established within a defined group of people when 
 
 98. Sanders v. Am. Broad. Cos., 978 P.2d 67, 69 (Cal. 1999) (“[E]mployees 
may enjoy a limited, but legitimate, expectation that their conversations and other 
interactions will not be secretly videotaped by undercover television reporters, 
even though those conversations may not have been completely private from the 
participants’ coworkers.”). 
 99. 582 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 100. Id. at 1223. 
 101. Id. at 1224. 
 102. 945 F.2d 1422 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 103. Id. at 1424. 
 104. Id. at 1427. 
 105. 830 F. Supp. 274 (D. Md. 1992). 
 106. 607 F. Supp. 1262 (D. Nev. 1985).  Even though the court uses the Fourth 
Amendment analysis of a subjective expectation of privacy that society is prepared 
to recognize as reasonable, the decision illustrates that there is no privacy 
expectation in this situation because seclusion cannot be established.  Id. at 1264. 
 107. Marrs, 830 F. Supp. at 283–84; Kemp, 607 F. Supp. at 1264. 
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steps are taken to keep information within that group and an 
alleged intruder is outside that group. 
Applying this framework to the Spec-Tator group that Pietrylo 
created on MySpace suggests that Pietrylo created seclusion 
because privacy was “thrown about his . . . affairs.”108  Pietrylo 
created a secluded virtual space when he activated the privacy 
settings on the MySpace group.109  The only way to gain access to 
the group was by invitation.110  Furthermore, MySpace and other 
social networking websites require an account name and 
password,111 which helps assure that a person cannot sign in as 
another person without authorization.  Finally, Pietrylo stated that 
his intention of creating the group was to provide a forum to talk 
openly about what occurred at work without management hearing 
of it.112  These facts support a finding that Pietrylo created a private, 
virtual space because the group was only available to a limited 
number of people and it was not part of a larger common area. 
 Moreover, the seclusion of the virtual space was not destroyed 
by the presence of the other group members being able to read the 
posts.  Using the seclusion-within-a-group line of analysis,113 
Pietrylo’s expectation of privacy applies only to those outside the 
group, just as the expectation of privacy in a jailhouse gym or at a 
hospital social event applies only to a television-viewing audience.  
Because the Hillstone Restaurant management was explicitly not 
part of Pietrylo’s group,114 he maintained his seclusion from those 
individuals. 
 
 
 108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977); see supra notes 2–4 
and accompanying text. 
 109. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
108834, at *2 (D.N.J. July 24, 2008). 
 110. Id. 
 111. See, e.g., FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/ (last visited Sept. 14, 
2011); LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com/home?trk=hb_home (last visited Sept. 
14, 2011); MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2011) (click 
the login link at the top to access the site); TWITTER, http://www.twitter.com/ (last 
visited Sept. 14, 2011). 
 112. Pietrylo, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108834, at *1–2. 
 113. See supra notes 91–107 and accompanying text (discussing cases where 
seclusion was established despite being in a group setting or in the presence of 
others). 
 114. Pietrylo, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108834, at *2. 
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a. Meaningful Distinction Between Simultaneous 
Dissemination and Secondhand Repetition 
It could be argued that the seclusion-within-a-group analysis 
does not apply because Hillstone was invited into the Spec-Tator 
group when St. Jean provided upper management with her 
MySpace account name and password.115  Even if St. Jean provided 
upper management with her account information free from 
coercion, the Sanders court would still find an intrusion into 
Pietrylo and Marino’s seclusion.  The Sanders court reasoned: 
While one who imparts private information risks the 
betrayal of his confidence by the other party, a substantial 
distinction has been recognized between the secondhand 
repetition of the contents of a conversation and its 
simultaneous dissemination to an unannounced second 
auditor, whether that auditor be a person or a mechanical 
device.  Such secret monitoring denies the speaker an 
important aspect of privacy of communication—the right 
to control the nature and extent of the firsthand 
dissemination of his statements.116 
Even though the posts on the Spec-Tator group remained 
accessible to the group members for an extended period of time, as 
opposed to a television camera capturing a moment in time, 
Hillstone entered an on-going private conversation under the 
pretext of being an actual participant in that conversation, much 
like the telepsychic investigative reporter posing as a coworker.117 
But is the Sanders court’s distinction between simultaneous 
dissemination and secondhand repetition meaningful?  Is there 
something worth protecting with simultaneous dissemination that 
is not destroyed by secondhand repetition?  If St. Jean had told 
upper management exactly what was posted on the Spec-Tator 
group without giving them access to the site itself, there would be 
no intrusion, the same information would have been disclosed, and 
Pietrylo and Marino would still have been fired.  For the distinction 
between simultaneous dissemination and secondhand repetition to 
be meaningful in intrusion upon seclusion claims, the distinction 
must serve the ultimate goal of protecting the space, regardless of 
the information that was discovered, because the tort is complete as 
soon as the intrusion is made.  If the essence of Pietrylo’s case were 
 
 115. Id. at *2–3. 
 116. Sanders v. Am. Broad. Cos., 978 P.2d 67, 72 (Cal. 1999) (quoting Ribas v. 
Clark, 696 P.2d 637, 640–41 (Cal. 1985)). 
 117. Id. at 70. 
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the publication of the posts to those outside the Spec-Tator group, 
then his intrusion upon seclusion claim should not be allowed to 
go forward because the invasion would not be the harm.  While it is 
not the goal of this article to provide a full and complete answer to 
this issue, a closer examination of the distinction between 
simultaneous dissemination and secondhand repetition can 
provide a more complete picture of what constitutes seclusion and 
the values intended to be protected. 
The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis on the 
privacy interests protected during searches rejects the distinction 
between simultaneous dissemination and secondhand repetition.  
In United States v. White, the defendant and a government 
informant, Harvey Jackson, engaged in illegal narcotic 
transactions.118  A series of four conversations took place at 
Jackson’s home, during which an agent hid in the kitchen closet 
with Jackson’s consent, overhearing the conversations, and a 
second agent outside Jackson’s home listened using a radio 
receiver from the wire that Jackson wore.119  The Court ruled that 
the government did not violate the Fourth Amendment,120 
reasoning that for constitutional purposes, 
no different result is required if the agent instead of 
immediately reporting and transcribing his conversations 
with defendant, either (1) simultaneously records them 
with electronic equipment which he is carrying on his 
person . . . (2) or carries radio equipment which 
simultaneously transmits the conversations either to 
recording equipment located elsewhere or to other agents 
monitoring the transmitting frequency.121 
The Supreme Court’s analysis found no legitimate privacy interests 
in the right to control firsthand dissemination as the Sanders court 
did. 
The White decision appears to put the Fourth Amendment at 
odds with the distinction the Sanders court made between 
simultaneous dissemination and secondhand repetition in 
intrusion upon seclusion claims.  Moreover, the defendant’s liberty 
interest associated with the Fourth Amendment is greater than a 
plaintiff’s privacy interest in controlling firsthand dissemination, 
yet the liberty interest loses and the privacy interest prevails.  These 
 
 118. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 746 (1971). 
 119. Id. at 747. 
 120. Id. at 754. 
 121. Id. at 751. 
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conflicting outcomes can nevertheless be reconciled upon a closer 
examination of the values associated with each. 
The overriding value in the Supreme Court’s decision in White 
appears to be ensuring the proper functionality of the criminal 
justice system.  The Court made a value judgment: there is no 
privacy interest in interpersonal, face-to-face interactions when 
committing a crime.122  The Court reasoned, “[i]nescapably, one 
contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his 
companions may be reporting to the police.”123  If the Court were 
to provide a privacy right under the Fourth Amendment to protect 
the right to control the nature and extent of the firsthand 
dissemination of one’s statements, then it would be creating an 
opportunity for criminal behavior to continue.  The Court 
recognized this possibility and explained, “[n]or should we be too 
ready to erect constitutional barriers to relevant and probative 
evidence which is also accurate and reliable.”124  The Court 
identified the benefits of allowing an electronic recording into 
evidence, which included a more reliable rendition of what 
occurred, making it less likely an informant will change his mind to 
testify, less of a chance that threat or injury will suppress 
unfavorable evidence during trial, and less likely that cross-
examination will confound the testimony.125  All of these values 
enhance the functionality of the criminal justice system, which 
appeared to be the Court’s primary concern.126  As a result, the 
distinction between simultaneous dissemination and secondhand 
repetition was properly rejected because the balance between a 
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights and the State’s interest in 
preventing and punishing crime would have been improper. 
The distinction between simultaneous dissemination and 
 
 122. Other Fourth Amendment rights still apply.  If the officer hiding in 
Jackson’s kitchen closet had not first received consent from Jackson, it would have 
been an illegal entry into Jackson’s home without a warrant.  Likewise, if the police 
had placed a listening device in Jackson’s kitchen without consent from Jackson or 
a warrant, that too would be a violation of the Fourth Amendment.  
 123. White, 401 U.S. at 752. 
 124. Id. at 753. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id.  The Court stated: 
Considerations like these [benefits to the criminal justice system] 
obviously do not favor the defendant, but we are not prepared to hold 
that a defendant who has no constitutional right to exclude the 
informer’s unaided testimony nevertheless has a Fourth Amendment 
privilege against a more accurate version of the events in question. 
Id. 
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secondhand repetition is properly enforced, however, in a claim for 
intrusion upon seclusion because the values in this tort shift to 
protecting the privacy of the space created.  What is important in 
intrusion upon seclusion is maintaining the integrity of an area that 
people have sought to make private so that actions and 
communications that are intended to be private remain so.  A value 
protected by maintaining the integrity of seclusion includes what 
Julie Inness identifies as intimacy.127  She argues that “privacy 
cannot be captured if we focus exclusively on either information, 
access, or intimate decisions because privacy involves all three 
areas” and suggests that “these apparently disparate areas are 
linked by the common denominator of intimacy—privacy’s content 
covers intimate information, access, and decisions.”128  Inness states 
that “intimacy” draws its meaning from one’s “love, liking, or care.  
Intimate decisions concern such matter and, thus, involve a choice 
on the agent’s part about how to (or not to) embody her love, 
liking, or care.”129  In light of her ideas about intimacy, Inness 
developed a conception of privacy, under which privacy “now 
amounts to the state of the agent having control over decisions 
concerning matters that draw their meaning and value from the 
agent’s love, caring, or liking.  These decisions cover choices on the 
agent’s part about access to herself, the dissemination of 
information about herself, and her actions.”130  As such, “the 
construction of intimacy lies on the agent’s shoulders.”131 
Inness’s construction of privacy aligns with intrusion upon 
seclusion.  The Restatement (Second) of Torts requires that the 
plaintiff “throw[]” privacy about his person or affairs.132  Likewise, 
the construction of intimacy is on the agent’s shoulders, meaning it 
is the agent—or plaintiff—who has the burden to make a space 
private.  Pietrylo did this by making the Spec-Tator a private group.  
Pietrylo also shared intimate communications and ideas.133  While 
his comments about his place of employment and employer are not 
intimate in the physical or sexual sense, Pietrylo’s comments do 
 
 127. JULIE INNESS, PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION 56 (1992); see also SOLOVE, 
supra note 13, at 34–37 (surveying similar theories of intimacy). 
 128. INNES, supra note 127.  
 129. Id. at 75. 
 130. Id. at 91. 
 131. Id. 
 132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977). 
 133. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
108834, at *3–4 (D.N.J. July 24, 2008). 
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draw on his caring and liking, or lack thereof, for his workplace.134  
Finally, Pietrylo attempted to control access and dissemination of 
information about himself by making the group private.135  All of 
the elements of Inness’s conception of privacy are met by Pietrylo’s 
actions. 
The value that is protected through the distinction between 
simultaneous dissemination and secondhand repetition is intimacy 
and maintaining space for intimacy to occur.  While secondhand 
repetition is always a concern, such repetition does not threaten 
the space where intimacy can occur.  Rather, it forces people to 
evaluate with whom they wish to share intimate information.  
Simultaneous dissemination, however, threatens the space itself.  
Inness incorporates access to oneself and the dissemination of 
information about oneself into her conception of privacy,136 which 
the Sanders court echoes by protecting the right to control the 
nature and extent of the firsthand dissemination of one’s 
statements.137  Therefore, because intrusion upon seclusion involves 
intimacy where criminal behavior does not, the distinction between 
simultaneous dissemination and secondhand repetition is properly 
recognized in intrusion upon seclusion to protect the integrity of 
the space. 
b. MySpace Page Not Similar to an Open Office Space  
It could instead be argued that the virtual space associated 
with the MySpace page created an area of common space shared by 
multiple coworkers, similar to the open office space found in 
Marrs138 or Block.139  However, this argument fails because the Spec-
Tator group (i.e., the virtual space) was only weakly associated with 
the workplace.  There is no evidence that the MySpace group was 
accessed at the restaurant because Pietrylo and Marino were servers 
and St. Jean was a greeter.140  The employees presumably had little 
to no access to computers with Internet access during their shifts.  
 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at *2. 
 136. See supra notes 127–31 and accompanying text. 
 137. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 138. Marrs v. Marriott Corp., 830 F. Supp. 274, 283 (D. Md. 1992) (videotaping 
an employee picking a locked desk in a common area). 
 139. Kemp v. Block, 607 F. Supp. 1262, 1264 (D. Nev. 1985) (overhearing a 
heated argument while at work). 
 140. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
108834, at *2–3 (D.N.J. July 24, 2008) (discussing how the employees at the 
restaurant gained access to the website). 
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Moreover, Pietrylo’s stated intention was to air criticism outside the 
presence of management, which could not be done freely at the 
restaurant because a supervisor or manager would always be on 
duty.141  The fact that Pietrylo dissociated the Spec-Tator group 
from the restaurant is significant because upper management is 
removed from the space. 
c. Seclusion Need Not Be Absolute 
Even if the MySpace page were considered to be part of the 
workplace, the private website would be more akin to McIntyre and 
B.P.S. Guard Services than Marrs and Kemp.  McIntyre and B.P.S. 
Guard Services established that aural and visual privacy within the 
workplace does not need to be absolute.142  The precautions 
Pietrylo took to make the Spec-Tator group private made it more 
comparable to a personal office in a police station143 or an office 
section protected by curtains,144 rather than an open office area145 
or a shared common area.146 Therefore, Pietrylo could probably 
establish that his private group on MySpace met the seclusion 
requirement for a claim of intrusion upon seclusion. 
d. Apparent Authority 
Hillstone may argue that there was apparent authority to enter 
the Spec-Tator group when St. Jean provided her username and 
password, but the Fourth Amendment’s rule on apparent authority 
can be applied to intrusion upon seclusion to reject such an 
argument.  When a space is owned and controlled by more than 
one person so that they share common authority, any of those 
people can give consent to government agents to search the area.147  
The Court has held that common authority rests 
on mutual use of the property by persons generally having 
joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is 
reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has 
the right to permit the inspection in his own right and 
 
 141. Id. at *1–2. 
 142. Doe v. B.P.S. Guard Servs., Inc., 945 F.2d 1422, 1427 (8th Cir. 1991); 
United States v. McIntyre, 582 F.2d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir. 1978); see supra text 
accompanying notes 99–107. 
 143. McIntyre, 582 F.2d at 1224. 
 144. B.P.S., 945 F.2d at 1424. 
 145. Marrs v. Marriott Corp., 830 F. Supp. 274, 283 (D. Md. 1992). 
 146. Kemp v. Block, 607 F. Supp. 1262, 1263 (D. Nev. 1985). 
 147. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974). 
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that the others have assumed the risk that one of their 
number might permit the common area to be searched.148 
In Illinois v. Rodriguez, the Court expanded common authority to 
those who have apparent authority to give consent to a search 
based on whether the facts and circumstances would give a person 
of reasonable caution the belief that the person has authority over 
the area.149 
In the case of Pietrylo, assuming St. Jean gave her username 
and password free from any coercion, Hillstone may be able to 
claim that it received consent from St. Jean through apparent 
authority.  In Rodriguez, the fact that the third party had a key to the 
apartment was a significant fact in establishing apparent 
authority.150  The Rodriguez Court also considered the affirmative 
statements the third party made: she lived there and had furniture 
and clothing in the apartment.151  Here, St. Jean’s username and 
password were the virtual equivalent to a key, giving Hillstone 
access to the Spec-Tator group.  However, St. Jean was not the 
creator of the group152 and would not have had administrative 
privileges unless Pietrylo had assigned them to her.153  Thus, St. 
Jean did not have the ability to control membership or content of 
the group, edit the group’s description or settings, or remove or 
ban members.154  Instead of having common authority over the 
group, she was the equivalent of a guest in a virtual room, limited 
to the features enabled by the group’s creator.155  St. Jean’s 
apparent authority would not extend so far as to give a reasonably 
cautious person the belief that she shared joint control over the 
 
 148. Id. at 171 n.7. 
 149. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990). 
 150. Id. at 179–81. 
 151. Id. at 179.  The assertions made by the third party were ultimately proven 
false and it was determined that she did not have common authority over the 
apartment.  Id. at 181–82. 
 152. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
108834, at *1 (D.N.J. July 24, 2008). 
 153. See Facebook Help Center Admin Basics, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com 
/help/?page=18829 (last visited Sept. 14, 2011) [hereinafter Facebook Admin Basics] 
(click on the description of “What is a group admin?”).  A group member can be 
given administrative privileges and gain all of these abilities by the creator or 
another administrator of the group.  Id.  Without administrative privileges, a 
member can only post comments on the group’s wall, post pictures, or do any 
other activities allowed by the settings of the group.  See Facebook Help Center Group 
Features, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=18832 (last visited 
Sept. 14, 2011) [hereinafter Facebook Group Features]. 
 154. See Facebook Admin Basics, supra note 153. 
 155. See Facebook Group Features, supra note 153. 
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group. 
Further analogizing a username and password to a key in the 
context of social networking websites likewise does not give 
Hillstone apparent authority to enter the Spec-Tator group.  
Compare a Facebook profile to a hotel.  The manager of the hotel 
has the master key to all of the rooms.  Some of the rooms are 
vacant, so the manager could enter those rooms without violating 
anyone’s privacy.  Other rooms are checked out, and if the 
manager, or anyone else, were to use the key and enter without the 
occupants’ permission, it would invade their privacy.156  Here, a 
Facebook profile is the hotel, the individual’s username and 
password are the master key, and the groups of which the user is a 
member are the rooms.  The groups that are left open are like the 
vacant rooms—a person can enter them without violating the 
occupant’s privacy.  The groups that are private are like the 
occupied rooms—they cannot be entered without permission.  Just 
as possession of a key by itself does not automatically demonstrate 
permission to enter a locked area, a username and password do not 
automatically demonstrate permission to enter a private group on a 
social networking website.  Therefore, having a username and 
password alone should not be sufficient to give apparent authority 
to enter a private group on a social networking website. 
2. Seclusion on the Internet 
Given the relatively new phenomenon of social networking 
websites, no court has explicitly ruled on the threshold question of 
when a website moves from the public to the private sphere, but 
other decisions provide valuable insight.  In United States v. Gines-
Perez, the district court in Puerto Rico ruled on the relationship 
between privacy and the Internet in a criminal case.157  The police 
identified the suspect by using a picture that was taken from a 
business website still under construction and not yet open to the 
public at large.158  It ruled that “a claim to privacy is unavailable to 
someone who places information on an indisputably, public 
medium, such as the Internet, without taking any measures to protect 
the information.”159 
Using similar reasoning, the Minnesota Court of Appeals in 
 
 156. See Prosser, supra note 14, at 389–90. 
 157. United States v. Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d 205, 225–26 (D.P.R. 2002). 
 158. Id. at 212–13. 
 159. Id. at 225. 
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Yath v. Fairview Clinics160 ruled that information the defendant 
posted on an open MySpace page was necessarily made public 
under a theory of publication of private facts—a related invasion-of-
privacy claim provided by section 652D of the Restatement.161  In a 
concurring opinion, Judge Johnson suggested that the analysis 
would be different if it had been a private webpage,162 but the 
majority opinion never addressed the issue because it was not part 
of the fact pattern.  Dealing with a restricted website, the Ninth 
Circuit in Konop found that controlling Internet access by assigning 
account names and passwords was sufficient to create seclusion in a 
claim based on statutory privacy.163 
The common element among the different courts and the 
different contexts in which privacy is applied is whether the 
plaintiffs took steps to maintain their privacy.  The district court in 
Gines-Perez viewed the lack of any positive steps to keep the 
communications on the Internet private as a fundamental 
shortcoming for claiming privacy,164 while the Ninth Circuit in 
Konop found the issuance of account names and passwords to be 
sufficient.165  Because all social networking websites require a 
username and password, that alone may not be adequate, but the 
Yath concurrence suggests that a private webpage would be enough 
to establish privacy online.166  Therefore, because Pietrylo took 
affirmative steps to keep the MySpace group private by personally 
inviting each member into the group and stating that Spec-Tator 
was a private group,167 he probably could satisfy all three standards 
set forth by the different courts. 
C. Public Policy Reasons for Extending Seclusion to Virtual Spaces 
Giving private online spaces the protection of “seclusion” 
would discourage Facebook “stalking” and the like.  Using Solove’s 
 
 160. Yath v. Fairview Clinics, 767 N.W.2d 34, 42–43 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009). 
 161. Id. at 43.  Restatement section 652A provides: “(1) One who invades the 
right of privacy of another is subject to liability for the resulting harm to the 
interests of the other.  (2) The right to privacy is invaded by . . . (c) unreasonable 
publicity given to the other’s private life, as stated in § 652D.”  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). 
 162. Yath, 767 N.W.2d. at 51 (Johnson, J., concurring). 
 163. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 164. Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d at 225. 
 165. Konop, 302 F.3d at 884. 
 166. Yath, 767 N.W.2d at 51 (Johnson, J., concurring). 
 167. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
108834, at *2 (D.N.J. July 24, 2008). 
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framework of surveillance and its associated harms,168 James 
Grimmelmann describes “Facebook stalking” as occurring when a 
person snoops into the profiles of distant acquaintances of those 
whom are considered to be outside one’s general social network.169  
Similar to a Peeping Tom looking through a window at night, the 
Facebook stalker looks through the virtual window of a person’s 
profile or group. 
The privacy paradox in which social network users disclose 
large amounts of personal information, yet retain a sense of 
privacy,170 asserts itself most prominently when plaintiffs assist their 
stalkers by accepting friendship requests of distant acquaintances.171  
People who accept many distant acquaintances as “friends” and do 
not set any privacy settings may rightfully react with indignation 
that their personal information was accessed by someone outside of 
their normally accepted social network,172 but they should not be 
surprised because that is exactly what they gave them permission to 
do.  Even employers are taking advantage of social networking 
pages that are left open.  A survey by the Ponemon Institute 
reported that “61% of professional services companies, which 
includes law firms, conduct Google searches on job candidates . . . . 
[and] more [than] 50% of the companies also search social 
network websites, such as Facebook and MySpace.”173 
The Restatement and case law seem to indicate that when a 
social network user leaves an online profile or group open, 
seclusion cannot be claimed, but when people access a private 
(protected) profile or group without authorization, they have 
intruded upon the seclusion of those protected by the privacy 
settings.174  The intruding party is not a part of that particular social 
 
 168. SOLOVE, supra note 13; see also supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text. 
 169. Grimmelmann, supra note 30, at 1167.  To define the boundaries of a 
social network—and the status of those members as truly a friend or more of an 
acquaintance—is difficult because it is a fluid concept.  Offline social networks are 
interconnected and porous, making online social networks even more 
interconnected and porous because MySpace and Facebook “friends” can change 
so quickly and they can be accumulated in mass.  Levin & Abril, supra note 33, at 
1046.  The average Facebook user has 130 “friends.”  Statistics, supra note 27. 
 170. See Levin & Abril, supra note 33, at 1045; see also Grimmelmann, supra 
note 30, at 1167–68 (quoting a social network user’s expectations of privacy). 
 171. Cf. Levin & Abril, supra note 33, at 1018–19 (“[T]he making of ‘friends’ 
online for the sake of mere accumulation of a large number of ‘friends’ as a status 
symbol is a growing online social phenomenon in itself.”). 
 172. Id. at 1001–02. 
 173. Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Emerging Employment Law Issues, SP024 ALI-ABA 
1995, 2253 (2008). 
 174. Supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text. 
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network, and the plaintiff has taken steps to retain one’s privacy.  
Although “Facebook stalking” and other unauthorized entries into 
a profile or group are initially invisible,175 making detection and a 
successful claim difficult, it does not mean that the plaintiff’s 
seclusion does not exist.  The ubiquitous use of the Internet and 
social networking websites has challenged the strength of privacy 
protections in the virtual realm, and the law should respond to 
provide plaintiffs with a meaningful remedy. 
V. HIGHLY OFFENSIVE TO A REASONABLE PERSON 
Users of social networking websites should be able to establish 
an intrusion into a private area when profiles or groups are made 
private, but such an intrusion must be highly offensive.176  The 
highly offensive standard is a high threshold for plaintiffs to meet 
and was designed to make bringing a claim difficult.177  This section 
discusses whether and under what circumstances an intrusion into 
a private profile or group on a social networking website would be 
highly offensive by first examining the Restatement; second, 
analyzing case law; and third, identifying public policy concerns. 
A. Rule for What Constitutes Highly Offensive 
As a threshold issue, the common law requires that an 
intrusion “be highly offensive to a reasonable person.”178  There is 
no liability unless the interference with the plaintiff’s seclusion is 
substantial and a reasonable person would strongly object to the 
 
 175. See Grimmelmann, supra note 30, at 1168. 
 176. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
 177. See id. at cmt. d (“There is . . . no liability unless the interference with the 
plaintiff’s seclusion is a substantial one, of a kind that would be highly offensive to 
the ordinary reasonable man, as the result of conduct to which the reasonable 
man would strongly object.”); see also Prosser, supra note 14, at 422–23.  Prosser 
expresses concern over how far intrusion upon seclusion should go, explaining 
that “the question may well be raised whether there are not some limits, and 
whether . . . a lady who insists upon sun-bathing in the nude in her own back yard 
should really have a cause of action for her humiliation when the neighbors 
examine her with appreciation and binoculars.”  Id. at 422.  He concludes, “This is 
not to say that the developments in the law of privacy are wrong. . . . It is to say 
rather that it is high time that we realize what we are doing, and give some 
consideration to the question of where, if anywhere, we are to call a halt.”  Id. at 
423.  See also Richards & Solove, supra note 58, at 1890 (“Prosser [the primary 
author of the Restatement (Second) of Torts] was deeply skeptical of the privacy 
torts. . . .”). 
 178. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
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intrusion.179  Knocking on the plaintiff’s door or calling the 
plaintiff, even two or three times for payment of a debt, does not 
constitute a “highly offensive” intrusion because the actions do not 
amount to a substantial burden to the plaintiff’s existence.180 
B. Case Law Interpreting the Definition of Highly Offensive 
The Nevada Supreme Court noted that what constitutes 
“highly offensive” is “largely a matter of social conventions and 
expectations,”181 and identified factors that contribute to 
determining whether an intrusion was highly offensive: “the degree 
of intrusion, the context, conduct and circumstances surrounding 
the intrusion as well as the intruder’s motives and objectives, the 
setting into which he intrudes, and the expectations of those whose 
privacy is invaded.”182  The California Supreme Court echoed some 
of the same factors, stating that “all the circumstances of an 
intrusion, including the motives or justification of the intruder, are 
pertinent to the offensiveness element.”183  The Nevada and 
California Supreme Courts identify a broad-range, overlapping, 
and non-exhaustive list of factors.184  While this is only a very 
selective representation of jurisdictions, it does suggest a totality-of-
the-circumstances approach to analyzing the factor of “highly 
offensive.”  The result is that it gives courts broad authority to 
decide whether intrusion upon seclusion claims can go forward, 
and injects a degree of uncertainty into the outcome of jury cases. 
In Pietrylo, Hillstone management used the username and 
password of a current group member to secretly and deliberately 
gain access to the group to monitor and evaluate what it ultimately 
concluded were “offensive” statements.185  The facts surrounding 
 
 179. Id. at cmt. d. 
 180. Id.  An example of when an intrusion is “highly offensive” and thereby 
invades a plaintiff’s privacy is when “telephone calls are repeated with such 
persistence and frequency as to amount to a course of hounding the plaintiff, that 
becomes a substantial burden to his existence.”  Id. 
 181. PETA v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d 1269, 1281 (Nev. 1995) (quoting 
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 5.10(A)(2) (1993)).  
 182. Id. at 1282 (quoting Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Ct. 
App. 1986)). 
 183. Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 493 (Cal. 1998); see also 
Sanders v. Am. Broad. Cos., 978 P.2d 67, 73–74 (Cal. 1999) (“Privacy for purposes 
of the intrusion tort must be evaluated with respect to the identity of the alleged 
intruder and the nature of the intrusion.”). 
 184. See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 493; PETA, 867 P.2d at 1133. 
 185. Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
108834, at *3–4 (D.N.J. July 24, 2008). 
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Hillstone’s intrusion using the factors from the Nevada and 
California courts could be sufficient to classify Hillstone’s actions as 
“highly offensive.” 
The first factor of degree of intrusion and Hillstone’s conduct 
would favor Pietrylo.  Hillstone committed a complete intrusion 
into the virtual space because upper management used the account 
name and password of a member to gain full access and read all of 
the material posted on the Spec-Tator group.186  Upper 
management did not accidentally stumble across the website, but 
made a conscious decision to enter the website and view its 
contents.187 
A second factor is the context and circumstances surrounding 
the intrusion, which may also favor Pietrylo.  Hillstone acted with 
secrecy and deliberateness in accessing the Spec-Tator group,188 a 
private virtual space not associated with and operated separately 
from the restaurant’s business.  The stealth of Hillstone’s actions 
may contribute to the degree of offensiveness for some juries.  The 
users of online social networking websites are disproportionately 
represented by younger generations who may be more sensitive to 
online intrusions,189 as market research shows that only ten percent 
of online socializers are older than fifty-five, while almost fifty 
percent of online socializers are younger than thirty-five.190 
Finally, Hillstone’s motives and objectives are probably 
canceled out by Pietrylo’s privacy expectations.  Hillstone’s 
objective was to see what its employees were saying about the 
restaurant.191  The fact that Hillstone ultimately fired Pietrylo and 
 
 186. Id. at *3. 
 187. Id.  
 188. See id. (giving upper management the username and password to read the 
unedited posts). 
 189. Levin & Abril, supra note 33, at 1001–02 (users of social networking 
websites react with indignation when their profiles are accessed by those outside 
their social network). 
 190. Id. at 1017.  However, surveys from April 2008 and April 2009 indicate 
that the highest growth percentage for Facebook users was the 35–49 year-old 
demographic, followed by the 50–64 year-old demographic.  Product Briefs, 26 No. 
21 LAW. PC 12, 12–13 (2009); see also Camille Broussard, Teaching with Technology: Is 
the Pedagogical Fulcrum Shifting?, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 903, 912 (2009) (referring 
to the generation of young adults who are totally comfortable with emerging 
technologies as “digital natives,” and those who use web-based applications and 
technologies, but for whom it is not their native soil, as “digital immigrants”). 
 191. See Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., No. 06-5754, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
108834, at *3–4 (D.N.J. July 24, 2008) (viewing and printing content from the 
Spec-Tator). 
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Marino192 indicates that its objective in intruding upon the Spec-
Tator group was to determine if any employees had committed 
misconduct.  This suggests that Hillstone entered knowing that it 
was not invited and that the company was searching for employee 
misconduct.  Having intentions where punishment would be a 
likely consequence seems more offensive than if a member of 
upper management had discovered the website by accident and 
surveyed it out of general curiosity. 
However, Hillstone’s objectionable motives to control what it 
deemed to be offensive behavior are balanced by Pietrylo’s 
objective expectations of privacy.193 While Pietrylo maintains that 
he expected everything to remain private within the Spec-Tator 
group, he did invite several people to be members of an online 
group.194  Information on the Internet can spread rapidly and has a 
high degree of permanency once posted.195  Unlike a conversation 
in a physical room, where the spoken word has no lasting presence, 
posted material on the Internet can remain indefinitely.196  The 
nature of the Internet makes an intrusion less offensive than if 
Hillstone had clandestinely listened to a spoken conversation.  
While Hillstone’s motives may factor in favor of Pietrylo, they seem 
to be balanced out by Pietrylo’s chosen medium. 
C. Public Policy Reasons for Extending the Concept of “Highly Offensive” 
to Virtual Spaces 
The factors to determine what is highly offensive, presented 
above,197 are necessarily judgment calls for the finder of fact to 
decide.  While it is a subjective process, the factors appear to 
advance a concept of personal dignity, and understanding the role 
of personal dignity through the development of the right to privacy 
provides guidance for determining what constitutes “highly 
offensive.”  In 1890, Warren and Brandeis reasoned:  
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon 
advancing civilization, have rendered necessary some 
 
 192. Id. at *4. 
 193. See id. at *18 (“A right to privacy may be a source of  ‘a clear mandate of 
public policy’ that could support a claim for wrongful termination; however, these 
privacy interests will be balanced against the employer’s interests in managing the 
business.”). 
 194. Id. at *2. 
 195. See Levin & Abril, supra note 33, at 1046. 
 196. See id. 
 197. See supra Part V.B. 
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retreat from the world, and man, under the refining 
influence of culture, has become more sensitive to 
publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more 
essential to the individual; but modern enterprise and 
invention have, through invasions upon his privacy, 
subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater 
than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.198 
Their reflection on society could apply equally well to social 
networking websites today.  Warren and Brandeis went on to argue 
that developments in technology made solitude and privacy more 
essential to the individual.199 
Edward Bloustein contends that Warren and Brandeis’s right 
to privacy protects personal dignity, which should be the 
fundamental concept courts use to decide cases of intrusion upon 
seclusion.200  Bloustein explains, “[O]ur Western culture defines 
individuality as including the right to be free from certain types of 
intrusions.  This measure of personal isolation and personal 
control over the conditions of its abandonment is of the very 
essence of personal freedom and dignity . . . .”201  The Shulman 
court couched its intrusion analysis in Bloustein’s reasoning,202 
finding that an intrusion into private places, conversations, or 
matters represents the best example of an invasion of privacy.203  
Moreover, sociological research suggests that even when people are 
in public spaces, they need personal space for “comfort, ease, and 
relaxation.”204 
In Pietrylo, Hillstone’s intrusion may meet the element of 
“highly offensive” when using Bloustein’s definition of privacy 
based on the loss of personal isolation and the loss of personal 
control of choosing when to abandon that seclusion.  Pietrylo 
created a space to relax and find comfort with other coworkers and 
by excluding management from the Spec-Tator group, Pietrylo 
attempted to create a partially isolated place to vent about personal 
matters, such as his feelings about his workplace.205  When upper 
management entered the Spec-Tator group, Hillstone intruded 
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upon Pietrylo’s isolation by invading the area Pietrylo had created 
for comfort, ease, and relaxation among his coworkers and friends.  
Moreover, upper management took away Pietrylo’s personal 
control of abandoning his privacy.  Personal dignity is lost as soon 
as an intruder penetrates the private virtual space that was created 
because it destroys limited personal isolation and usurps the 
personal control of choosing when and how to abandon one’s 
seclusion. 
A second reason personal dignity should play a role in 
determining offensiveness is because it best conceptualizes the 
harm associated with invasion of privacy claims involving digital 
information.  Currently, the competing theoretical approach to the 
dignity paradigm is that online privacy is rooted in control.206  This 
theory provides people, groups, and institutions with the autonomy 
to decide when, how, and to what extent information is shared with 
other people.207  So long as people have control over the personal 
information that is disclosed about them, there is no violation of 
privacy.208  When someone intrudes on another’s autonomy by 
gaining access to private information, the latter has lost control and 
there is an invasion of privacy.209 
There are three challenges to this theory.  First, online social 
networks are extremely complex, large, and fluid, making any 
control settings difficult to maintain if used to keep out specific 
people or particular types of people.210  Second, when information 
is in digital form, it can easily be copied, distributed, and 
manipulated.211  The control approach may not always offer 
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adequate protection to a plaintiff, because the ease at which 
information is created and distributed makes the control approach 
difficult to apply and thus unenforceable.212  Finally, the 
Restatement only seeks to protect against “highly offensive” 
behavior.213  Loss of control is not inherently offensive.  Rather, it is 
the nature of the space and the manner in which the space is 
intruded upon that may be offensive. 
A personal dignity approach provides a clearer line of when an 
intrusion highly offends a reasonable person.  When a defendant 
intrudes upon a private place, conversation, or matter214 that 
inhibits the comfort, ease, and relaxation215 of the plaintiff, the 
plaintiff’s personal dignity has been highly offended.  Pietrylo 
created a private MySpace group to vent about occurrences at work 
with other restaurant employees outside the presence of 
management.216  Hillstone intruded upon this private conversation 
by using St. Jean’s account name and password.217  Hillstone also 
inhibited Pietrylo’s comfort, ease, and relaxation because it 
effectively shut down the space and then fired him from his job.218  
This would probably be highly offensive to a reasonable person’s 
sense of personal dignity. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This article began with the question of whether a private, 
virtual space created by a social networking website would be 
covered by the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 652B (1977).  
Given the relatively new emergence of social networking websites, 
this issue is just beginning to be addressed by courts.  While courts 
have been slow to integrate new technologies into privacy law,219 
the tort of intrusion upon seclusion should be extended to cover 
intrusion into private areas created on social networking websites 
because the language of the Restatement is sufficiently broad, it 
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would be a natural extension of the case law, and public policy 
favors such an interpretation. 
Under the first factor—intentional intrusion, physical or 
otherwise—an intrusion of a virtual space should be assessed based 
on whether the defendant learned of the plaintiff’s private affairs 
or matters through a type of surveillance.  The second factor—
establishing an expectation of seclusion or solitude on social 
networking websites—should be evaluated not by the number of 
people who have access to the profile or group, but rather by the 
privacy settings the plaintiff has implemented to restrict access to 
his or her information.  Finally, the third factor—determining what 
is highly offensive—should be analyzed through a lens of personal 
dignity that takes into account the private space, conversation, or 
matter intruded upon and the result of whether the plaintiff’s 
comfort, ease, and relaxation were inhibited.  Such an extension of 
the tort of intrusion upon seclusion will provide the proper 
protection to online social network users who make the effort to 
keep certain messages and material private on the Internet. 
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